

Workforce Demographics and Technology Adoption

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Introduction

- **Population Aging** is transforming advanced economies.
 - ▶ U.S.: labor force growth ↓ from 2% in 70s to 0.8% today, and to 0.3% by 2060.

Q. What is the impact of population aging on **aggregate labor productivity**?

- Standard View
 - ▶ **Scale effect** reduces output, productivity, and firm creation.
Hopenhayn et al. [2022], Maestas et al. [2023], Bloom et al. [2020], Karahan et al. [2024]
- Our Focus: Composition shifts from **younger** to **older workers**.
 - ▶ Old: accumulates **more experience** on the job $\implies \uparrow$ **Productivity** \rightarrow Standard
 - ▶ Young: better endowed with **up-to-date skills** $\implies \uparrow$ **Technology Adoption** \rightarrow New
- Effects on aggregate productivity ex-ante ambiguous + multiple channels at play.

Today's Talk

Empirics: young workers have a **comparative advantage** in new technologies.

1. Firms with Younger workforce: \uparrow Prob. Adopt Tech.
2. Young workers: \uparrow Prob. tech-related tasks + Productivity Gains from Adoption.
3. Adoption tilts workforce toward young workers.

Theory: firm dynamics + labor market frictions + multidimensional skills.

- **Young workers:** better at **tech** tasks, **Old workers:** better at **production** tasks.
- Advanced technologies are intensive in **tech** tasks.
- **Q.** Effect of **population aging** on **productivity** through:
 1. Endogenous Technology Adoption;
 2. Allocation of Workers to Firms.

Outline

1. Empirical Analysis
2. The Model
3. Productivity and Misallocation

Data

- **LPP-ADIAB**: Survey of ICT adoption.
 - ▶ Employer + Employees: reports on tech usage and its effects (2015, 2019, 2021).
- **BHP** (1993-2021): Admin Data on firms' size and workforce composition.
- **IAB-BP** (1993-2021): Annual representative survey of establishments.
 - ▶ Value Added, Investment, On-the-job training, Digitalization Info.
- **SIAB** (1985-2021): Admin Data on employment histories.
 - ▶ Wage, Occupations, Unemployment Spells, Education Level, Demographics.

LPP-ADIAB Overview

- **Sample:** \approx 750 establishments per wave.
 - ▶ Representative of firms $>$ 50 employees.
 - ▶ Representative survey of employees are surveyed (7 per firm avg.)
- Advanced technologies surveyed
 - ▶ **Digital:** e.g., IoT, Big Data Analytics, AI, Virtual Reality.
 - ▶ **Automation:** e.g., Robots, Drones, Additive Manufacturing.
- Usage Options (for each tech.)
 - ▶ Use $<$ 2 years ago \rightarrow **Adoption Event** at $t - 2$.
 - ▶ Use $>$ 2 years ago \rightarrow **Control/Exclude**.
 - ▶ Not Use.

Workforce Composition and Tech Adoption


Q. Are firms with a **younger workforce** more likely to adopt advanced tech?

Empirical Specification

$$\mathbb{I}(\text{Adopt})_t = \alpha + \beta \text{ Under 35 (\%)}_{t-1} + \Gamma X_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$$

- **Baseline Controls:** Firm Size, Firm age, Avg. Wage, College (%), Hiring Rate, Type of Owner.
- **Fixed Effects:** Sector 3-digit, State, Year, # Tech already used.

Young Workforce Predicts Higher Adoption



- Young Workforce \implies Extensive (\uparrow Pr. Adopt) + Intensive margin (# Techs)

Tasks and Tech Effect on Workers

Q1. Are **younger workers** more likely to carry out **tech-related tasks**?


Q2. How do new technologies affect workers' tasks and productivity?

Empirical Specification

$$\mathbb{I}(Y_{it}) = \alpha + \beta \text{Age}_{it} + \Gamma X_{it} + \underbrace{\gamma_{f(it)}}_{\text{Firm FE}} + \varepsilon_{f(it),t}$$

- **Outcomes** (Y_{it})
 - ▶ Task-Related Questions (All Sample)
 - ▶ Impact of Tech (Only in Adopting Firms)
- **Baseline Controls**: Wage, Occupation Tenure, Firm Age.
- **Fixed Effects**: Firm, Year, Task Complexity, College, Occupation (3-digit)

Young perform more Tech-Related Tasks



Young report Productivity Gains for Tech Adoption



Event Study Around Adoption

Q. How does firms' **employment** and **workforce composition** change after adoption?

Empirical Strategy


- Compare dynamic outcomes of **adopting** vs **non-adopting** establishments.

Empirical Specification


$$y_{ft} = \alpha_f + \gamma_t + \sum_k \underbrace{\theta_k D_{ft}^k}_{\text{Non-Adopters}} + \sum_k \underbrace{\beta_k (D_{ft}^k \times \text{Tech Adoption}_f)}_{\text{Adopters}} + \varepsilon_{ft},$$

- **Outcomes** (y_{ft}): Log-Employment, Empl. Composition, Empl. Shares, Wages
- **Fixed Effects**: Establishment, Sector 3-digit, State, Year.

Event Study - Employment




(a) Log Employment




(b) Age Heterogeneity

- Firms expand employment **primarily by hiring young.**

Event Study - Employment Share




(a) Age Heterogeneity




(b) College Heterogeneity

- Workforce tilts toward **young workers**.
- Age shift **not driven** by education composition.

Event Study - Incumbent Workers



(a) Log-Wage



(b) Days Worked

- Young Incumbents enjoy higher earnings \implies Productivity Gains.
- No observable trend in days worked.

Outline

1. Empirical Analysis
2. The Model
3. Productivity and Misallocation

Overview of the Model

- Model Ingredients
 1. Firm Dynamics + Endogenous Technology Adoption.
 2. Workers are heterogeneous in multi-dimensional skills.
 3. Frictional Labor Market → Workforce is a state variable for the firms.
 - ▶ Directed Search from Unemployment.
- Purpose of the Model
 1. **Decompose** impact of population aging on productivity into **multiple-channels**
 - ▶ Technology Adoption.
 - ▶ Firm Dynamics + Allocation of workers to firms via search frictions.
 2. **Policy Counterfactuals**: e.g., subsidy to on-the-job training / changing firing costs.

Agents

- **Workers**, heterogenous in
 - ▶ **Tech skills**, high (H) or low (L): $s_T \in \{\gamma_T^H, \gamma_T^L\}$
 - ▶ **Production skills**, high (H) or low (L): $s_P \in \{\gamma_P^H, \gamma_P^L\}$
 - ▶ Four types: $s \in \mathcal{S} \equiv \{LL, LH, HL, HH\}$
- **Multi-worker firms**, heterogeneous in
 - ▶ **Workforce Composition**: $\vec{n} = \{n_s\}_{s \in \mathcal{S}}$
 - ▶ **Idiosyncratic Productivity** (z): Exogenous
 - ▶ **Technological Level** (τ): Endogenous

Demographics and Skill Transitions

Workers' skill transitions are inherently linked to the individual life cycle:

- New entrants (“young”):
 - ▶ start with high tech skills ($s_T = H$) with probability ω
 - ▶ start with low production skills ($s_P = L$).
- Over time:
 - ▶ Tech skills become obsolete at rate λ_T : $\gamma_T^H \rightarrow \gamma_T^L$
 - ▶ Workers accumulate production experience at rate λ_P : $\gamma_P^L \rightarrow \gamma_P^H$
- Firms can re-train workers in tech skills at cost c_e : $\gamma_T^L \rightarrow \gamma_T^H$
- Workers retire at rate λ_r .

Population \mathcal{L} evolves according to $\underbrace{\mu_t}_{\text{New Entrants}} = \mathcal{L}_t \underbrace{g}_{\text{Population growth rate}} + \lambda_r \mathcal{L}_t$

Production Technologies

- At any instant, two technologies are available:
 - ▶ **Frontier** ($\tau = 0$) and **Laggard** ($\tau = 1$)
- The production function of technology τ is

$$y_\tau = \underbrace{z\lambda^{-\tau}}_{\text{TFP}} \underbrace{\left[\alpha_\tau L_T^\rho + (1 - \alpha_\tau)L_P^\rho \right]^\rho}_{\text{Labor Composite}}, \quad \eta < 1, \quad \lambda > 1$$

- **Trade-off**

- ▶ Frontier ($\tau = 0$): higher TFP but load more on high-skill workers ($\alpha_0 > \alpha_1$)

Task Assignment

Given \vec{n} , workers are split between Tech (T) and Production (P) to solve

$$y_{\tau}^* = \max_{\vec{n}} y_{\tau}(L_T, L_P)$$

$$\text{s.t. } L_T = \underbrace{\gamma_T^H (n_{HH}^T + n_{HL}^T)}_{\text{High Skill}} + \underbrace{\gamma_T^L (n_{LL}^T + n_{LH}^T)}_{\text{Low Skill}} \quad (\text{Tech Workers})$$

$$L_P = \underbrace{\gamma_P^H (n_{HH}^P + n_{LH}^P)}_{\text{High Skill}} + \underbrace{\gamma_P^L (n_{LL}^P + n_{HL}^P)}_{\text{Low Skill}} \quad (\text{Production Workers})$$

Technology Transitions

Firms can pay $\mathbf{a} \geq 0$ to affect the following:

- **Tech-Upgrade.** Laggard become Frontier at rate

$$q_{10}(\underline{\mathbf{a}}_+) \equiv \mathbb{P}(\text{Upgrade}) = \bar{q}_{10}[1 - \exp(-\chi \mathbf{a})]$$

- **Tech-Downgrade.** Frontier become Laggard at rate

$$q_{01}(\underline{\mathbf{a}}) \equiv \mathbb{P}(\text{Downgrade}) = \bar{q}_{01} \exp(-\varphi \mathbf{a})$$

- **Obsolescence.** Laggard firms exit the market at rate

$$q_{12}(\underline{\mathbf{a}}) \equiv \mathbb{P}(\text{Obsolescence}) = \bar{q}_{12} \exp(-\varphi \mathbf{a})$$

Unemployed Workers

The value of an unemployed worker of type $i \in \mathcal{S}$ is

$$(\rho + \lambda^r)U_i = \max_W \left\{ b + \underbrace{\mu_i(W)}_{\text{Job Finding Rate}} \max\{W - U_i, 0\} + \underbrace{\lambda_T(U_{L,SP} - U_{H,SP})}_{\text{Tech Obsolescence}} \underbrace{\mathbb{1}\{s_T = H\}}_{\text{High-tech Worker}} \right\}$$

$$\implies \mu_i(W) = \frac{(\rho + \lambda^r)U_i - b - \lambda_T(U_{L,SP} - U_{H,SP})\mathbb{1}\{s_T = H\}}{W - U_i}, \quad s_P \in \{L, H\}$$

Trade-off: job-finding rate is **inversely related** to the contract's promised value W

- $W \uparrow \implies$ submarket (i, W) attracts more workers $\implies \mu_i(W) \downarrow$, wait time \uparrow
- Continuum of active submarkets maximizing unemployment value.

Firms

- State Variables: $\vec{s} \equiv (z, \tau, \vec{n}, \vec{W}) = (z, \tau, \{n_i, W_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{S}})$, $\vec{n} \in \mathcal{N}_+^4$
- Hiring Process: firms post **one vacancy for each skill type** $i \in \mathcal{S}$
 - ▶ Choose the sub-markets $\{W_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{S}}$, taking job filling rate as given
 - ▶ Choose recruitment effort $\{v_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{S}}$ to increase matching probability, at cost $C_{v_i}(v_i)$
- Dynamic contracts $\mathcal{C}^\Sigma(\vec{s})$:

$$\mathcal{C}^\Sigma = \left\{ \{w_i, v_i, \delta_i, W'_i(s_i^+)\}_{i \in \mathcal{S}}, \pi_e, a_\tau \right\}$$

- ▶ Wage: $w_i, \forall i$
 - ▶ Recruitment intensity: $v_i, \forall i$, at cost $C_{v_i}(v_i)$
 - ▶ Firing rate: $\delta_i, \forall i$ at cost $n_i C_{\delta_i}(\delta_i)$
 - ▶ Continuation Promise: $W'_i(s_i^+)$
 - ▶ Up-Skilling rate: π_e at cost $n_{L,sp} C_e(\pi_e)$
 - ▶ Investment: a_τ at cost $C_\tau(a)$
- Exogenous Shocks

Key Property of the Problem

- Assume:
 1. Utilities are linear and transferrable across agents
 2. Contract space is complete: state-contingent contracts
 3. Directed search

- Define the **Joint Surplus**: $\Sigma(\vec{n}, z, \tau) \equiv \underbrace{J(\vec{s})}_{\text{Firm's Value}} + \sum_i n_i \underbrace{W_i}_{\text{Worker's Value}}$

Proposition (Schaal [2017])

Solving the firm's problem is equivalent to maximize to joint surplus over the simpler contract space:

$$\mathcal{C}^\Sigma = \left\{ \left\{ \underbrace{v_i}_{\text{Recruitment}}, \underbrace{\delta_i}_{\text{Firing}}, \underbrace{W_i'(s_i^+)}_{\text{Continuation Promise}} \right\}_{i \in \mathcal{S}}, \underbrace{\pi_e}_{\text{Re-training}}, \underbrace{a_\tau}_{\text{Tech Investment}} \right\}$$

The joint surplus doesn't depend on promised utilities: new state space: $s = (\vec{n}, z, \tau)$

Joint Surplus Maximization

$$(\rho + s^F)\Sigma(s) = \max_{\mathcal{C}^\Sigma} \left\{ y - C_e(\pi_e)(n_{LL} + n_{LH}) - C_\tau(a_\tau) - \sum_i \left[C_{\delta_i}(\delta_i)n_i + C_{v_i}(v_i) \right] \right\}$$

$$\text{Outside Option} \quad + \sum_i n_i (\delta_i + s_i^W + s^F) \mathcal{U}_i$$

$$\text{Utility to New Hires} \quad - \sum_i v_i \eta_i (W'_i(s_i^+)) W'_i(s_i^+)$$

$$\text{Hiring} \quad + \sum_i v_i \eta_i (W'_i(s_i^+)) (\Sigma(s_i^+) - \Sigma(s))$$

$$\text{Separations} \quad + \sum_i (\delta_i + s_i^W) n_i (\Sigma(s_i^-) - \Sigma(s)) + \sum_i \lambda_r n_i (\Sigma(\vec{s}_{\lambda_o}) - \Sigma(\vec{s}))$$

$$\text{Skill Change} \quad + \sum_{i \in \{LL, LH\}} \pi_e (\Sigma(\vec{s}_{\pi_e}) - \Sigma(\vec{s})) + \sum_{i \in \{HL, HH\}} \lambda_T (\Sigma(\vec{s}_{\lambda_T}) - \Sigma(\vec{s})) + \sum_{i \in \{LL, HL\}} \lambda_P (\Sigma(\vec{s}_{\lambda_P}) - \Sigma(\vec{s}))$$

$$\text{Tech Change} \quad + \sum_{\tau'} \pi(\tau' | \tau, a_\tau) (\Sigma(s_{\tau'}) - \Sigma(s))$$

$$\text{Prod. Shock} \quad + \sum_{z'} F_z(z' | z) (\Sigma(s_{z'}) - J(s)) \left. \right\}$$

Workers' Continuation Promises

- Assume Cobb-Douglas matching function with **matching elasticity** γ ,

$$M(V, U) = V^\gamma U^{1-\gamma}.$$

- Then, worker's continuation promise is

$$W'_i(s_i^+) = \gamma \mathcal{U}_i + (1-\gamma) \underbrace{\left[\Sigma(s_i^+) - \Sigma(s) \right]}_{\text{Surplus Gain from Hiring}}, \quad \forall i \in \mathcal{S},$$

equivalent to Nash bargaining solution evaluated at the **Hosios condition**.

Potential Entrants

- Potential entrants' value:

$$J^e = \underbrace{-\kappa}_{\text{Entry Cost}} + \underbrace{p_0 \tilde{J}^e(\tau=0) + (1-p_0) \tilde{J}^e(\tau=1)}_{\text{Expected Profits}}$$

- ▶ Pay a flow cost to open a business: κ
- ▶ Enter as frontier with probability p_0 .

- Upon entry:

$$\tilde{J}^e(\tau) = \sum_z F^e(z) \left[\max_{\{W_i'\}} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{S}} \eta_i (W_i'(s_i^e)) J(s_i^e) \right], \forall i$$


- ▶ Draw a **random productivity shock** from F_z^e
- ▶ **Post one vacancy** for each type of worker, choosing the submarket W_i .

Stationary Equilibrium

A stationary equilibrium consists of **value functions** $J(s), W(s), \Sigma(s)$, **policy functions** $\{w_i(s), v_i(s), \delta_i(s), W'_i(s)\}_{i \in \mathcal{S}}, \pi_e(s), a_\tau(s)$, **unemployment values** $\{U_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{S}}$, a **per-capita distribution** $\Lambda(s)$, **per-capita masses of active firms** F and **entrants** F_e , **per capita measures of employment and unemployment** per each type $\{E_i, U_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{S}}$, such that:


- *Optimality holds.*
- *Distributions and measures per capita are stationary.*
- *Free-entry holds: $J^e = 0$*

Skill Composition and Technology Adoption



- Low g \implies \uparrow Experience-Skills, \downarrow Tech-Skills, \downarrow Frontier Adoption.

Employment Distribution Polarization



- **Low g** \implies Frontier become smaller + Laggard become bigger.

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Aggregate Productivity


Let **productivity** be defined as output per-worker (\mathcal{Y}/E).

Productivity Decomposition

Aggregate productivity can be decomposed as

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Productivity} &= \underbrace{(\text{Avg Size})^{1-\eta}}_{\text{DRS}} \times \text{Avg (Standardized) Output} = \\ &= (\text{Avg Size})^{1-\eta} \times \underbrace{\sum_{z,\tau} \text{Share}(z,\tau)}_{\text{Productivity Selection}} \times \text{Avg (Standardized) Output}(z,\tau) \\ &= (\text{Avg Size})^{1-\eta} \times \sum_{z,\tau} \text{Share}(z,\tau) \times \underbrace{\sum_n \sum_m}_{\text{Scale Composition}} \text{Output}(n,m) \times \underbrace{\text{Share}(m|n)}_{\text{Within-firm Misallocation}} \times \underbrace{\text{Share}(n)}_{\text{Between-firm Misallocation}} \end{aligned}$$

Productivity Decomposition



- Low $g \implies \uparrow$ Loss from Productivity Selection.

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Notation: Evolution of State Variables

Back

Remark: Given continuous time, only one state transition can happen simultaneously.

$$\vec{s}' \equiv (\vec{n}, z', \tau') \in \left\{ \begin{array}{ll} (n_{LL} + 1, \vec{s}_-), (n_{LH} + 1, \vec{s}_-), (n_{HL} + 1, \vec{s}_-), (n_{HH} + 1, \vec{s}_-) & \text{Hiring } i: \vec{s}_i^+, \forall i \\ (n_{LL} - 1, \vec{s}_-), (n_{LH} - 1, \vec{s}_-), (n_{HL} - 1, \vec{s}_-), (n_{HH} - 1, \vec{s}_-) & \text{Firing } i: \vec{s}_i^-, \forall i \\ (n_{LL} - 1, n_{HL} + 1, \vec{s}_-), (n_{LH} - 1, n_{HH} + 1, \vec{s}_-) & \text{Up-skilling: } \vec{s}_{\pi_e} \\ (n_{HL} - 1, n_{LL} + 1, \vec{s}_-), (n_{HH} - 1, n_{LH} + 1, \vec{s}_-) & \text{Obsolescence: } \vec{s}_{\lambda_T} \\ (n_{LL} - 1, n_{LH} + 1, \vec{s}_-), (n_{HL} - 1, n_{HH} + 1, \vec{s}_-) & \text{Experience: } \vec{s}_{\lambda_R} \\ (n_{LL} - 1, \vec{s}_-), (n_{LH} - 1, \vec{s}_-), (n_{HL} - 1, \vec{s}_-), (n_{HH} - 1, \vec{s}_-) & \text{Retirement: } \vec{s}_{\lambda_o} \\ (\tau', \vec{s}_-) & \text{Tech Change: } \vec{s}_{\tau'} \\ (z', \vec{s}_-) & \text{Prod. Shock: } \vec{s}_{z'} \end{array} \right.$$

Firm's Problem

Back

- Long-Term Contract: $\vec{c} = \left\{ \{w_i, v_i, \delta_i, W'_i(\vec{s})'\}_{i \in \{LL, LH, HL, HH\}}, \pi_e, a_\tau \right\}$

$$\rho J(\vec{s}) = \max_{\vec{c}} \left\{ y - C_e(\pi_e)(n_{LL} + n_{LH}) - C_\tau(a_\tau) + s^F (J^e - J(\vec{s})) \right.$$

$$\text{Workforce Costs} \quad - \sum_i \left[w_i n_i + C_{\delta_i}(\delta_i) n_i + C_{v_i}(v_i) \right]$$

$$\text{Hiring} \quad + \sum_i v_i \eta_i \left(W'_i(\vec{s}_i^+) \right) \left(J(\vec{s}_i^+) - J(\vec{s}) \right) \left. \right\}$$

$$\text{Separations} \quad + \sum_i \left(\delta_i + s_i^W \right) n_i \left(J(\vec{s}_i^-) - J(\vec{s}) \right) + \sum_i \lambda_r n_i \left(J(\vec{s}_{\lambda_o}) - J(\vec{s}) \right)$$

$$\text{Skill Change} \quad + \sum_{i \in \{LL, LH\}} \pi_e \left(J(\vec{s}_{\pi_e}) - J(\vec{s}) \right) + \sum_{i \in \{HL, HH\}} \lambda_T \left(J(\vec{s}_{\lambda_T}) - J(\vec{s}) \right) + \sum_{i \in \{LL, HL\}} \lambda_P \left(J(\vec{s}_{\lambda_P}) - J(\vec{s}) \right)$$

$$\text{Tech Change} \quad + \sum_{\tau'} \pi(\tau' | \tau, a) \left(J(\vec{s}_{\tau'}) - J(\vec{s}) \right)$$

$$\text{Prod. Shock} \quad + \sum_{z'} F_z(z' | z) \left(J(\vec{s}_{z'}) - J(\vec{s}) \right) \left. \right\} \quad \text{s.t.} \quad W_i(\vec{c}) \geq W_i, \quad W'_i \geq U_i, \quad \forall i$$

Aggregate productivity

$$\begin{aligned}
 \frac{\mathcal{Y}}{E} &= \frac{1}{E} \sum_{s \in \mathcal{S}} y^*(s) f(s) \\
 &= \frac{F}{E} \sum_{z, \tau} \frac{F_{z, \tau}}{F} \sum_n y^*(s) \tilde{f}_{z, \tau}(n) \\
 &= \underbrace{\left(\frac{F}{E}\right)^{1-\nu}}_{\text{Firm Size}} \sum_{z, \tau} \underbrace{\frac{F_{z, \tau}}{F}}_{\text{Firm Selection}} \underbrace{\sum_{\hat{n}, m} y_{z, \tau}^*(\hat{n}, m) g_{z, \tau}(\hat{n}, m)}_{\text{Workers Allocation}}
 \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

where

$$g_{z, \tau}(\hat{n}, m) = \sum_n \tilde{f}_{z, \tau}(n) \mathbb{I} \left\{ \frac{n}{E/F} = \hat{n} \ \& \ m_\tau = m \right\}$$